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A CASE FROM AUSTRALIA’S WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
NISHIMURA, 1950 
LISA LEE* 
In the aftermath of World War II, Australia undertook domestic trials of 
suspected Japanese war criminals between 1945 and 1951. This article 
focuses on Australia’s war crimes trial of Lieutenant-General Nishimura as 
held at the Los Negros court in mid-June 1950, and the subsequent 
petitioning period and confirmation process. The Australian war crimes 
courts were military courts vested with broad discretionary powers that 
facilitated the expeditious trials of accused. The procedure of war crimes 
courts differed from that of field general courts-martial in two main areas: 
admissible evidence and sentencing range — and this article highlights 
concomitant problems arising during the trial and subsequent case on 
review. This article examines the prosecution of the case entirely on 
documentary evidence; the impact of low admissibility thresholds for 
evidence; issues regarding the voluntariness and reliability of witness 
evidence; and the option of capital punishment in the Nishimura trial.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma1 was General Officer Commanding of 
the Konoe Division of the Japanese Imperial Army.2 During the Japanese 
invasion of the Pacific region, Nishimura and his Imperial Guard Division 
troops had engaged in the Battle of Muar, in Malaya.3 An Australian and 
Indian composite force, including members of the 2/29th Battalion, 65th 
Battery and 45th Indian Brigade, had to withdraw towards Yong Peng en route 
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to Parit Sulong.4 The Japanese forces had captured the bridge at Parit Sulong,5 
and the ensuing attacks forced the retreat of the Australian and Indian 
soldiers. The wounded were left behind and, on 22 January 1942, fell victim 
to what would become known as the Parit Sulong massacre.6 Approximately 
110 Australian and 35 to 40 Indian soldiers were captured by the Japanese.7 
The already injured prisoners of war were then inhumanely treated, deprived 
of water and medical aid, beaten, tortured, humiliated, assaulted with rifle 
butts and bayoneted before being executed by mass shootings and then 
cremated by Japanese soldiers.8 Some of the prisoners of war were burned 
alive, as not all had perished before the firing squad.  
Nishimura was charged with ordering the massacre and, in mid-June 1950, he 
was brought before the Australian war crimes court situated in Los Negros.9 
Nishimura’s co-accused in the trial was his personal aide, Captain Nonaka 
Shoichi. This article will focus exclusively on aspects of the trial pertaining to 
Nishimura. Due to the disturbing accounts of torture and murder during the 
Parit Sulong massacre, and to the facts that the majority of the victims were 
Australian, the total deceased numbered in excess of 150 persons, and 
Nishimura was a senior Japanese commander, this trial remains the most 
controversial of all the Manus Island proceedings. Strongly divergent opinions 
were expressed about the Nishimura trial at the time. Similarly, in subsequent 
analyses commentators have argued both for and against Nishimura’s guilt.10 
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In the immediate post-World War II period, the Australian government 
enacted specific legislation to facilitate its domestic war crimes trials. The 
War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) (‘War Crimes Act’) was based on the British 
Royal Warrant 1945.11 The War Crimes Act provided the legal framework for 
the war crimes courts and their applicable jurisdiction, rules of evidence and 
sentencing range.12 Australian military courts, convened pursuant to the War 
Crimes Act, were authorised to try accused charged with war crimes against 
any persons who had resided in Australia, British subjects, or citizens of 
Allied powers, from a period commencing on 2 September 1939.13 The War 
Crimes Act was supplemented by the Regulations for the Trial of War 
Criminals 1945 (Cth) (‘War Crimes Regulations’).14 The War Crimes 
Regulations further determined the composition of the courts, the appointment 
of judges-advocate, court procedure including that governing petitions by 
accused, and the powers of authorities to confirm, remit or commute 
sentences.15 The war crimes trials were to be conducted expeditiously.16 Trials 
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held in the war crimes courts were clearly differentiated from field general 
courts-martial with respect to admissible evidence and maximum sentences.17 
The Australian military authorities were vested with wide discretionary 
powers in regard to permissible forms of evidence. For the Australian 
authorities, the lowering of the evidentiary requirements assisted in expediting 
proceedings, given the difficulties in transporting witnesses to remote court 
locations around the Pacific region, and given also that in the post-War period 
witnesses may have died, or otherwise been unavailable to give oral testimony 
in court.18  
Part II of this article briefly outlines the background to the Nishimura trial. It 
then considers specific, and problematic, aspects of the trial that arose from 
the broad discretions exercised in the Australian war crimes courts.19 In Part 
III, the impact of the relaxed evidentiary standards on the conduct of the trial 
is examined. Part IV discusses Nishimura’s death sentence, and issues raised 
during the post-trial processes. Part V summarises residual questions 
concerning aspects of the Nishimura trial. The article concludes that, in the 
Nishimura trial, the threshold for admissibility of evidence was too low and 
the maximum sentence of capital punishment too high. The examination of 
these factors arguably raises questions about the standard of justice reflected 
in Nishimura’s trial. 
II BACKGROUND TO THE NISHIMURA TRIAL 
A The Charge 
Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma was charged with ‘committing a war 
crime that is to say murder in that [he] at Parit Sulong in Malaya on the 22 Jan 
                                                 
17 The late historian, David Sissons, who was a leading expert on the Australian war crimes 
trials, had previously written about criticisms that the War Crimes Act was ‘discriminatory’ 
against Japanese suspects in regard to the rules of evidence, death sentences and the 
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42 murdered a number of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War’.20 
Nishimura was alleged to have ordered the execution of the captured prisoners 
of war.21 Section 3 of the War Crimes Act provided two definitions of war 
crimes. Pursuant to section 3(a), a war crime was defined as a violation of the 
laws and usages of war.22 The laws of war required that prisoners of war were 
to be treated humanely, and that a surrendered enemy soldier must not be 
arbitrarily executed.23 Section 3(b) of the Act also provided a list of war 
crimes that were in the remit of the Board of Inquiry — comprising Sir 
William Webb, Justice Alan Mansfield and Judge Richard Kirby — appointed 
on 3 September 1945.24 While item (ii) of the Board of Inquiry’s list included 
‘murder and massacre, systemic terrorism’,25 the charge against Nishimura 
clearly fell within the scope of section 3(a) of the War Crimes Act.  
Captain Nonaka Shoichi was alleged to have assisted in the commission of the 
murders by passing on the order for execution to the officer in charge of the 
prisoners of war, Lieutenant Fujita Seizaburo.26 In an unfortunate turn of 
events, Fujita managed to abscond on 8 September 1949 while he was in the 
midst of being interrogated by members of the Australian War Crimes Section 
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Evidence (emphasis added). 
21 Ibid.   
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Report on War Crimes by Individual Members of the Armed Forces of the Enemy Against 
Australians, 15 March 1944, vol 1, 11. 
23 See, eg, Hague Convention IV 1907 art 4; Red Cross Convention 1929 art 3; Prisoners of 
War Convention 1929 art 3.  
24 The Board of Inquiry was appointed pursuant to the National Security (Inquiries) 
Regulations, NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/382 — ‘National Security (Inquiries) Regulations’ issued 
by Attorney-General and Minister of State for External Affairs H V Evatt, 3 September 1945.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
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in Japan.27 He subsequently eluded capture by the Japanese police, and was 
eventually removed from the charge sheet as the third-named accused.28 
B Nishimura’s Defence 
At trial, Nishimura maintained his innocence. He argued that he had not given 
any orders for the execution of the prisoners of war. Rather, he argued that the 
order he had given was ‘shobun seyo’, meaning ‘dispose of’, and was 
intended by him to mean that the prisoners of war were to be evacuated to the 
rear.29 The accused gave evidence that if he had wanted the prisoners of war 
to be executed, he would have given the explicit order of ‘shokei’, meaning 
‘execute’. Nishimura submitted that his instructions were for the prisoners of 
war to be returned to the headquarters of General Yamashita, Commander of 
the 25th Battalion and Nishimura’s superior,30 which was some distance away.  
C The Court 
Nishimura’s trial was presided over by Brigadier Kenneth Townley, ordinarily 
a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland.31 The other court members were 
Lieutenant-Colonel N F Quinton, Major E J Gerling, Major H F Hayes and 
Major W E Clarke.32 Court members were experienced in matters of military 
service but were not required to have legal qualifications. Ad hoc 
appointments of judges-advocate were sometimes made to advise court 
members on points of law but this was not a compulsory requirement.33 In 
Nishimura’s trial, no judge-advocate had been appointed.34 The Court did not 
issue written reasons for its findings, as was the practice of the war crimes 
courts. The absence of written reasons has contributed to the proliferation of 
varying interpretations and constructions of aspects of the trial. 
                                                 
27 NAA: A471, 81942 — Affidavit of James Gowing Godwin, 20 October 1949. 
28 NAA: A471, 81942 — Record of Military Court — Nishimura and Nonaka, Précis of 
Evidence.. See also NAA: M1505, 916 — Extract of Japanese Police Report, 1949.  
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30 Kyoichi Tachikawa, ‘Yamashita and his Style of Leadership’ in Brian Bond and Kyoichi 
Tachikawa (eds), British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941–45 
(Frank Cass, 2004) 75, 81.  
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32 Ibid.  
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34 NAA: A471, 81942 — Order for Assembly and Proceedings of a Military Court, 23 May 
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The prosecuting counsel was Charles Rooney KC, and prosecuting officer 
Major H J Foster (Barrister and Solicitor, and Australian Army Legal Corps 
member) appeared as his junior.35 The sole Defence Advisory Officer was 
Major George Dickinson (Barrister, and Australian Military Forces officer),36 
who assisted the Japanese defence counsel in all the trials at Manus Island. 
The allocated defence lawyer was Nakayama Choji, a lawyer with 
qualifications from Tokyo University.37 The Japanese interpreters allocated to 
the trial were Akio Honda, Michiomi Suwabe and a ‘Mr Muramaru’, 
alongside an Australian interpreter, Sergeant V Shaw.38   
III THE IMPACT OF LOWER ADMISSIBILITY THRESHOLDS IN 
THE WAR CRIMES COURT  
War crimes courts were designed with very low admissibility standards for 
evidence, compared to the courts-martial and domestic courts with criminal 
jurisdiction of the period.39 Section 9(1) of the War Crimes Act provided:  
At any hearing before a military court the court may take into consideration 
any oral statement or any document appearing on the face of it to be 
authentic, provided the statement or document appears to the court to be of 
assistance in proving or disproving the charge, notwithstanding that the 
statement or document would not be admissible in evidence before a field 
general court martial.40 
Regulation 11 of the War Crimes Regulations stated that it ‘shall be the duty 
of the Court to judge the weight to be attached to any evidence given in 
pursuance of section 9(1) of the Act which would not otherwise be 
admissible’.41 These evidentiary provisions enabled the war crimes courts to 
exercise an extremely broad discretion with regard to admissible evidence. 
The practical effect of section 9(1) and regulation 11 was that the prosecution 
                                                 
35 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 2.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
39 NAA: A1066, H45/580/2 —Sir William Webb (Speech delivered at the International 
Relations Club in Queensland University, 26 June 1945). Webb’s opinion was that domestic 
court procedures were ‘too slow, cumbersome and technical for the trial of war criminals’. 
Webb stated in his first report that should ‘strict rules of evidence’ apply, there would be 
problems with providing sufficient evidence, NAA: A10950, item 1 — William Webb, A 
Report on War Crimes by Individual Members of the Armed Forces of the Enemy Against 
Australians, 31 October 1944, vol 2, 2. 
40 War Crimes Act s 9(1).  
41 War Crimes Regulations reg 11.  
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was permitted to present cases based on documentary evidence alone. No 
prosecution witnesses were called during Nishimura’s trial, since prosecuting 
counsel tendered the written statements of witnesses at the commencement of 
trial, as permitted under the legislation.  
The failure to call witnesses was problematic in this trial. In particular, 
questions arose as to the prosecution witnesses’ identification of the accused, 
the inconsistencies in their testimony as to what Nishimura had said, and the 
fact that court members were not given the opportunity to evaluate the 
evidence and credibility of the witnesses in person.  
A Witness Ben Hackney 
The main prosecution witness in the trial was Lieutenant Ben Charles 
Hackney, an Australian soldier in the 2/29th Battalion who had survived the 
Parit Sulong massacre.42 Hackney had been captured by the Japanese forces at 
Parit Sulong, and subjected to cruelty, torture and inhumane treatment.43 He 
only survived the massacre by pretending to be dead. His first-hand account 
of the massacre thus formed a crucial element of the prosecution’s case. 
Despite the potential force of his evidence, Hackney was not called as a 
witness at the trial. Instead, the prosecution principally relied upon his sworn 
affidavit.  
Of the events leading up to the Parit Sulong massacre, Hackney stated in his 
affidavit that:  
One of these new arrivals was outstanding and presumably the Commander 
of the Japanese Forces in the area — a short, stocky fellow ... He looked at 
the officer prisoners, who were made to move off the steps and stand ... 
Upon leaving the building he spoke to one of the officers accompanying 
him who in turn passed on what were apparently orders to the Jap [sic] in 
charge of the prisoners ... About sunset the guards began to move around 
the house. Machine guns were brought from where they had been resting 
between tours of duty and placed in front of the building.44 
The prosecution used this evidence during the trial to suggest that the 
commander referred to was Nishimura. In August 1946, the 1 Australian War 
Crimes Section (based in Singapore) forwarded four photographs of 
Nishimura to Army Headquarters in Melbourne, requesting that they be 
                                                 
42 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings, Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 4–6. 
43 NAA: A471, 81942 — Affidavit of Ben Charles Hackney, 12 November 1945.   
44 Ibid.   
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produced to Hackney for identification purposes.45 Hackney was unable to 
positively identify Nishimura as the senior Japanese officer he had seen at 
Parit Sulong,46 and had referred to and described in his affidavit.47 
Nishimura’s prison file noted that he was five feet and five inches tall (about 
1.65 metres), and weighed 147 pounds (about 66 kilograms).48 Yet, in his 
affidavit, Hackney had referred to a Japanese officer who was ‘short’ and 
‘stocky’.49 In this trial, Hackney’s identification evidence was pivotal to the 
prosecution’s case. The fact that it appears that the key prosecution witness 
was unable to positively identify Nishimura, and that there was no opportunity 
for the defence to cross-examine Hackney or for this information to be 
presented before the court, gives rise to concerns about this aspect of the trial.  
On the other hand, Nishimura had not denied that he had been present at the 
scene of the Parit Sulong massacre at the relevant time. Under cross-
examination, Nishimura conceded that he had inspected the prisoners of 
war.50 Nishimura’s main line of defence was that his instructions had been 
incorrectly interpreted, and that he had not intended for the prisoners of war to 
be executed. However, while  Hackney’s affidavit identified one ‘outstanding’ 
presumed commander, it also referred to other senior Japanese officers, as 
well as soldiers, also present at the scene.51 These officers included the Chief 
                                                 
45 NAA, MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Memorandum from Australian Military Forces, 18 March 
1946, where it is stated in relation to Nishimura and two other Japanese accused that 
‘[i]mmediately upon their arrival the suspects will be photographed at full length for 
identification by Lieut. HACKNEY’. NAA, MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Letter from 1 
Australian War Crimes Section (SEAC) to Army Headquarters Melbourne, 2 August 1946 
forwarding four photographs of Nishimura for production to Hackney ‘to see whether he can 
identify NISHIMURA as the high ranking Officer who visited Parit Sulong immediately 
before the massacre took place’ (capitalisation in the original).  
46 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Message from Army Melbourne to 1 Australian War Crimes 
Section (SEAC) stated in reference to the Parit Sulong war crimes, ‘Hackney unable to 
identify Nishimura’. See also NAA, MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Letter from 1 Australian War 
Crimes Section (SEAC) to War Crimes Investigation Team in Singapore, 14 October 1946, 
which requested an update on the interrogation of Nishimura and stated that Hackney could 
not identify Nishimura.   
47 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Letter from Lieutenant-General GOC Eastern Command to 
Army HQ, 24 September 1946. It was stated that Hackney was unable to identify Nishimura 
as the senior Japanese officer referred to in paragraphs 26–28 of his affidavit.  
48 NAA: B5563, 928 — Long Sentence Prisoner’s Record — Nishimura.  
49 NAA: A471, 81942 — Affidavit of Ben Charles Hackney, 12 November 1945, 5.   
50 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 36.  
51 NAA: A471, 81942 — Affidavit of Ben Charles Hackney, 12 November 1945; Mant, above 
n 3, 33; NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Report on the Parit Sulong Massacre by Lieutenant 
H P Leach, 1 December 1947; NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Letter from OC 1 Aust War 
Crimes Sec (SEAC) to AHQ Melbourne, 6 November 1946. Preliminary investigations 
initially focused on Major-General Kobayashi Takashi, Commander of the Infantry Brigade, 
2nd Japanese Imperial Guards Division.   
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of Staff of the Konoe Division, Colonel Imai Kamejiro, who was in charge of 
the prisoners of war, Staff Officer Supply, Major Morioka Eisaku, and Senior 
Adjutant, Major Toda Takeshi.52 Imai, Morioka and Toda had all died before 
the commencement of the trial.53 Given Hackney’s inability to positively 
identify Nishimura, and the presence of other senior Japanese officers, the 
trial proceedings failed to test the presumption that it must have been 
Nishimura who had given the order to execute.  
B Witnesses Lieutenant Inagaki, Captain Hinokuma 
and Captain Sono 
Hackney’s affidavit was not the only evidence tendered by the prosecution. 
The statements of three Japanese Armed Forces Officers, Lieutenant Inagaki 
Tadahiro, Captain Hinokuma Fukashi and Captain Sono Yoko, were also 
relied upon by the prosecution in its case against Nishimura. The evidence of 
the three Japanese witnesses was crucial to the court’s reconstruction of what 
Nishimura had said at the scene, as Hackney could not understand Japanese 
and could not attest to this aspect of the prosecution case.  
The prosecution adduced evidence from the three Japanese witnesses through 
their written statements. Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono had given sworn 
statements in 1949 (the ‘1949 statements’) to Captain James Gowing Godwin, 
an investigating officer in the 2 Australian War Crimes Section in Tokyo.54 In 
these statements, the officers had attested that they had witnessed Nishimura 
giving to Nonaka a verbal order for execution to pass to the officer in charge 
of the prisoners of war. The relevant portion of Inagaki’s statement reads:  
After Lieutenant-General Nishimura had stepped down off the porch and 
rejoined us other officers, he turned to Lieutenant Nonaka who was standing 
beside him and gave him, as far as I can now recall, the following oral 
order: ‘Instruct the officer in charge of the prisoners of war’ (rank and name 
was stated but I now cannot remember same) ‘to execute all the prisoners of 
war by firing squad.’55  
The section in Hinokuma’s statement reads:  
                                                 
52 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 16.  
53 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript — Nishimura and Nonaka, Closing Address of Defence. 
See also NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Certified Copy of Report on Death of Imai Kamejiro 
(date of death 22 March 1947), 7 November 1949; NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1962 — Certificate 
of Death of Toda Takeshi (date of death 30 January 1949), 17 September 1949.   
54 Silver, above n 4, 304.  
55 NAA: A471, 81942 — Statement of Inagaki Tadahiro, 3 October 1949 (emphasis added), 3.  
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After Lieutenant-General Nishimura and others had stepped down from the 
porch and rejoined the other officers, he turned to his Personal Aide, 
Lieutenant Nonaka, and in the hearing of all the officers present, including 
myself, gave him, as far as I can now recall, the following oral order: 
‘Instruct the officer in charge of the prisoners of war’ (rank and name was 
stated, but I now cannot remember same) ‘to execute the prisoners of war in 
a suitable manner.’56  
Sono’s statement was to similar effect:  
Almost immediately after Lieutenant-General Nishimura and others had 
descended the steps and rejoined us other officers, he turned to his Personal 
Aide Lieutenant Nonaka Shoichi who was standing near him, and in the 
hearing of all those officers present, including myself, gave him, as far as I 
can now recall, the following oral order: ‘Instruct the officer in charge of 
the prisoners of war’ (rank and name was stated but I now cannot remember 
same) ‘to execute all the prisoners of war by firing squad.’57 
The 1949 statements contained similar passages, or slabs of evidence. On the 
one hand, the similarity of witness evidence may be proof that the accused did 
or said what the witnesses recalled. On the other hand, if witness evidence is 
remarkably similar, indeed almost identical, then the evidence may have been 
the result of coaching or coercion during interrogation. The impact of 
translation is another relevant factor, as it is also possible that during the 
translation process Australian investigating officers or translators may have 
used similar language to translate the respective statements. Upon later review 
of the evidence in 1950, Deputy Assistant Director of Legal Services at the 
Australian Military Forces Headquarters, Major Maxwell Ham, noted that 
sections of Hackney’s evidence were mirrored in statements of other Japanese 
witnesses.58 Ham stated that in his opinion ‘the marked similarity does lend 
considerable weight to the allegations made that the words were largely put 
into their mouths’ by Godwin.59  
In contrast to Ham’s view, the subsequent opinion of the Judge-Advocate 
General, Supreme Court Justice William Ballantyne Simpson, was that the 
similarities across the witness statements resulted from Godwin using the 
standard interrogation procedures — in other words, Godwin would have 
unconsciously handled the matters using a methodology of chronological 
                                                 
56 NAA: A471, 81942 — Statement of Hinokuma Fukashi, 18 October 1949 (emphasis added), 
3–4. 
57 NAA: A471, 81942 — Statement of Sono Yoko, 14 October 1949 (emphasis added), 3.   
58 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from DADLS M Ham to AG Co-ordinator, 8 
September 1950.  
59 Ibid.  
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ordering.60 Silver too argues that Godwin used the standard process of 
interrogation, double translation, and arrangement into chronological order to 
produce the witness statements.61 The end result was a statement compiled by 
the investigator, and translated for the witness before signing and swearing.62 
However, while the chronological ordering of statements addresses issues of 
form, it does not satisfactorily explain the content. The paraphrasing of 
statements by investigators, and the extent to which this was undertaken, does 
not adequately explain the high degree of consistency across the 1949 
statements.  
In an unusual set of circumstances, Nishimura’s defence counsel also tendered 
statements that had subsequently been made by the same witnesses in 1950 
(the ‘1950 statements’). These statements were tendered, peculiarly, in the 
trial’s closing stages. While the witness statements reiterated that Nishimura 
had given a directive of sorts, the 1950 statements referred to an order to 
‘dispose of’ the prisoners of war.63 This evidence differed from the witnesses’ 
1949 statements and their reference to an order to ‘execute’. The 1950 
statements were inconsistent with the 1949 statements, and also raise concerns 
about the credibility of the three Japanese witnesses.  
The evidence of the Japanese witnesses was extremely important to the 
outcome of the trial because, as Major Ham stated, ‘the whole matter of 
Nishimura’s guilt depends on what he intended the word “Shobun” to signify. 
If he did not intend the prisoners to be executed, then the executions were the 
result either of a mistake or of wilful disobedience’.64 However, despite the  
1949 and 1950 statements being inconsistent and arguably unreliable, the 
broad scope of section 9(1) of the War Crimes Act and regulation 11 of the 
War Crimes Regulations meant that the witnesses’ sworn statements were 
unable to be closely examined in court. If these key witnesses had been called 
to give testimony at the trial, their evidence would have been subject to the 
rigours of cross-examination.  
                                                 
60 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from Judge-Advocate General Simpson to Adjutant 
General, 12 September 1950.  
61 Silver, above n 4, 377. 
62 Ibid.  
63 NAA: A471, 81942 — Statement of Inagaki Tadahiro,  14 March 1950; NAA: A471, 81942 
— Statement of Hinokuma Ryo, 18 March 1950; NAA: A471, 81942 — Statement of Sono 
Yoko, 13 March 1950. Inagaki attributed both orders for disposal and cremation to Nishimura 
whilst Hinokuma and Sono stated Nishimura gave the first order and Imai then ordered the 
cremation.  
64 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from DADLS Maxwell Ham to AG Co-ordinator, 8 
September 1950.  
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Nishimura’s defence counsel, Nakayama, stated in his closing address that 
‘[t]his case, which has exhibited to the fullest extent the defects of this trial by 
documentary evidence, is on a high level ... the evidence is not material 
evidence, it is mere hearsay of witnesses, and lacks accuracy, which anyone 
connected with Court procedure is well aware [sic]’.65 Nakayama’s statement, 
while put forward in support of his clients’ case, also highlights inherent 
problems with prosecuting trials on documentary evidence alone. Whereas 
this practice enables the expeditious conduct of trials, it also compounds the 
difficulties in the conduct of the defence cases for the accused. In this case, 
while the standard of proof remained ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, in practice, 
the lower admissibility thresholds effectively shifted the burden of proof onto 
defence teams.66 As the prosecution could present cases on documentary 
evidence alone, the onus of proof then shifted to the defence lawyers and 
accused, who had to attempt to refute the admissibility, or disprove the 
authenticity, of the documentary evidence — in the absence of the oral 
testimony of witnesses. Japanese defence lawyers were already faced with 
language and cultural barriers, unfamiliarity with Australian military courts 
and common law principles, and comparatively short timeframes for 
preparation. Dickinson described the Japanese lawyers as being inexperienced 
and lacking in guile.67  
Moreover, the court’s ability to ascertain and accord appropriate weight to 
evidence was affected by the absence of witnesses appearing in person to 
assist in this process. As witnesses were not called to testify during the trial, 
whether the evidence was genuine, conspiratorial, coerced or misinterpreted 
was not properly tested.  
IV NISHIMURA’S DEATH SENTENCE, PETITIONS AND THE 
CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
On 22 June 1950 the war crimes court found Nishimura guilty and sentenced 
him to death by hanging.68 The evidentiary issues raised in Part III should be 
considered in the context of the court’s sentencing range. It is argued that the 
lower admissibility thresholds combined with the option of capital 
                                                 
65 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, Closing 
Address of Defence, 2. 
66 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/980 — Letter from Sir William Webb to Minister for the Army 
F Forde, 8 January 1946.  
67 See Dickinson, ‘Japanese War Trials’, above n 9, 70; Dickinson, ‘Manus Island Trials’, 
above n 10, 70.  
68 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 101; 
NAA: A471, 81942 — Record of Military Court — Nishimura and Nonaka, Précis of 
Evidence; NAA: A471, 81942 — Warrant of Execution — Nishimura, 11 June 1951.  
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punishment were inherently problematic in this trial. Pursuant to section 11(1) 
of the War Crimes Act, the court was empowered to impose death sentences 
on convicted war criminals. Section 11(1) provided:  
A person found guilty by a military court of a war crime may be sentenced 
to and shall be liable to suffer death (either by hanging or by shooting) or 
imprisonment for life or for any less term; and, in addition or in substitution 
therefor, either confiscation of property or a fine of any amount, or both.69  
This was a broad power that exceeded the powers of standard courts-martial 
as such courts could not sentence an Australian soldier to death except for 
specified offences arising from traitorous or mutinous conduct.70  
There was no option of appealing Nishimura’s death sentence to an 
independent judicial body as the war crimes courts were military courts, and 
military courts did not have an appellate mechanism. Under the War Crimes 
Act, the Governor-General’s powers to confirm or order revision of findings, 
mitigate, commute or remit sentences, and defer executions, could be 
delegated.71 In this particular case, these powers were delegated to Adjutant-
General Major-General Warren Melville Anderson. The nature and scope of 
the war crimes delegations were distinguishable from those applicable at 
standard courts-martial as death sentences imposed on Australian soldiers 
could only be confirmed by the designated civil authority, the Governor-
General in Council.72 After concerns were raised in 1945 by the Secretary of 
the Department of the Army, Frank Roy Sinclair, over the confirmation 
procedure, the Chifley Government decided that death sentences in war 
crimes cases were to be referred to the Judge-Advocate General — a civil 
authority with legal expertise — for advice prior to the Adjutant-General 
being able to confirm any sentences.73  
Nishimura’s post-trial confirmation was exceptional as it deviated 
substantially from the normal process, as will be outlined below, and 
ultimately it was Cabinet that endorsed his death sentence.  
                                                 
69 War Crimes Act s 11(1). At the time, international law permitted death sentences for war 
crimes and section 11 was not unique to the Australian jurisdiction. For instance, the 
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were authorised to sentence 
convicted war criminals to death. See William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty 
in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2002) 263, 240. 
70 Defence Act 1903-1939 (Cth) (‘Defence Act’) s 98.  
71 War Crimes Act ss 5, 6.  
72 Defence Act s 98. See also Sissons, above n 17, 16.  
73 Sissons, above n 17, 16–17. Prior to the delegation of the power to confirm death sentences 
to the Adjutant-General on 23 April 1947, the Commander-in-Chief had exclusive authority. 
See, eg, Carrel, above n 10, 86. See also Pappas, above n 10, 46–8. 
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A The First Petitions 
On 29 June 1950, Nishimura and Nakayama filed petitions against the finding 
and sentence (the ‘first petitions’). Nishimura petitioned on various grounds: 
that the charge against him was false, the trial relied too heavily on 
documentary evidence, and he would never have given an order to execute by 
firing squad.74 Nishimura submitted that during his 40 years in the Japanese 
Army he had never been taught to give such an order.75 Nishimura also 
maintained that he should have been given more time in Japan to gather 
evidence for his defence, and that he had not had reasonable time to prepare, 
given that he had been held in custody in Singapore prior to being transported 
to Manus Island for trial.76 He claimed that the first time he became aware of 
the charge against him was aboard a transit ship to Manus Island on 21 May 
1950.77 Despite this, at the commencement of the trial, when the court asked 
whether defence counsel wished to apply to adjourn the matter on grounds 
including the ground that insufficient time had been given for defence 
preparation, Nakayama replied in the negative.78  
Judge-Advocate General Simpson, who subsequently considered the first 
petitions, agreed with the court’s findings.79 He concluded that ‘from the 
written evidence tendered by the prosecution it will be seen that there was 
ample evidence to justify a conviction if the court saw fit to accept such 
evidence as accurate’.80 Upon Judge-Advocate General Simpson’s advice, 
Adjutant-General Anderson confirmed the finding and sentence in 
Nishimura’s case on 7 August 1950.81 
                                                 
74 NAA: A471, 81942 — Petition from Nishimura Takuma to Confirming Officer, 29 June 
1950.   
75 Ibid.  
76 NAA: A471, 81942 — Petition from Nakayama Choji to the Confirming Officer, 29 June 
1950. 
77 Ibid. Nishimura had been serving time in Changi when the Australian Military Forces 
requested that he be transferred to Hong Kong by 6 April 1950, and then to Manus Island: 
NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1096 — Cipher Message from Army Melbourne to 2 Aust War 
Crimes Sec Tokyo, 18 February 1950. See also NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of 
Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 14, wherein Nishimura stated that it was en 
route from Hong Kong to Manus Island that he first learnt of his charges, and that he would 
be tried at a war crimes court. (He reached Manus Island less than one month before his trial 
was to commence.) The Prisoners of War Convention 1929 art 6 stipulated that notification 
should be given ‘as soon as possible’ before hearing, with particulars regarding the 
court/date/place to be delivered more than three weeks beforehand.  
78 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no/s 2-3.  
79 NAA: A471, 81942 — Letter from the Judge-Advocate General to Adjutant-General, 21 July 
1950.  
80 Ibid.  
81 See, eg, NAA: A471, 81942 — Confirmation by Adjutant-General Anderson, 7 August 1950.  
352 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 2 
B The Second Petition 
After the finding and sentence were confirmed, on 18 August 1950, 
Nakayama filed a second Notice of Petition (the ‘second petition’) requesting 
a new trial on the grounds of fresh evidence.82 Nakayama argued that there 
had been a miscarriage of justice, and sought to have his client’s Warrant for 
Execution postponed.83 He referred to new statements obtained from the three 
Japanese witnesses, Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono (the ‘new statements’). It 
was alleged that their original evidence had been obtained by ‘leading 
questions, intimidation and suggestion, and was distorted by the investigating 
officers, and raise[d] a serious doubt concerning the truth and probative value 
of the testimony contained in the original affidavits’.84 The new statements, 
which had been made after the 1949 and 1950 statements, were used in 
support of the defence’s submission that the evidence was unreliable.85   
As outlined in Part III of this article, on 8 September 1950, Major Ham 
examined the second petition. Ham referred to the Judge-Advocate General’s 
earlier review of the first petitions when he noted that there was ‘no 
substantial miscarriage of justice so far as the proceedings themselves are 
concerned’.86 The key issue, Ham noted, was the effect of the subsequent 
material forwarded in support of the second petition — namely, the new 
statements from the three witnesses. Ham underscored the similarities across 
the witness statements, and noted in particular that sections of Hackney’s 
affidavit were ‘closely reflected’ in the evidence of the Japanese witnesses.87 
Upon examination of the similarities in the 1949 statements, he noted two 
possibilities: either that Godwin, ‘being thoroughly conversant with what 
                                                 
82 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Petition for a New Trial from Nakayama Choji, 18 August 
1950. Nakayama had received some advice from Ben Bruce Blakeney, NAA: MP742/1, 
336/1/2137 — Letter from Nakayama Choji to the Commanding Officer, 31 July 1950; NAA: 
MP742/1, 336/1/2137 —  Letter from Ben Blakeney to Nakayama Choji, 5 July 1950. 
Blakeney was an eminent American defence lawyer who had worked on the Tokyo Trial. See 
Pappas, above n 10, 76.   
83 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2116 — Memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel A L MacDonald, 15 
September 1950.  
84 Ibid.  
85 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Statement of Inagaki Tadahiro, 12 July 1950. A detailed 
account was provided by Inagaki prior to his conclusion: ‘I cannot say my deposition of that 
time was absolutely right, because it was made under such circumstances I mentioned above’; 
NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Statement of Sono Harumitsu, 11 July 1950, ‘I was subjected 
to mental pressure very hard by his attitude and these languages to me [sic]’; NAA: MP742/1, 
336/1/2137 — Statement of Hinokuma Fukashi, 13 July 1950 also referred to leading 
questions. Hinokuma alleged that Godwin had said to him ‘[i]f you will not answer me 
quickly, you shall not be permitted to go home for ever’.  
86 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from DADLS Maxwell Ham to AG Co-ordinator, 8 
September 1950.  
87 Ibid.  
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Lieut Hackney had said more or less put the words into the mouths of the 
three Japanese’, or that the facts had an indelible impact on the witnesses.88 
Major Ham acknowledged the ‘tendency’ for accused to make accusations of 
improper conduct against interrogators during the war crimes trials. But, given 
the ‘marked similarity’ across the 1949 statements, Nishimura’s denials of 
guilt, and the weight placed on the evidence of the Japanese witnesses in the 
prosecution’s case against him, Ham concluded that there existed a 
‘reasonable doubt that there may have been a miscarriage of justice and as the 
life of a man depends on the matter being correctly evaluated I think that such 
action should now be taken’.89 The case was re-submitted to the Judge-
Advocate General.  
Subsequently, Judge-Advocate General Simpson advised that the differences 
in the statements, and Godwin’s use of chronological ordering, were sufficient 
reasons to find that the 1949 statements were valid.90 In Simpson’s opinion, 
the new statements did not constitute fresh evidence given that they could 
have been obtained during the trial, and that no miscarriage of justice had 
occurred.91 He advised that there were no grounds for a new trial.  
In an exceptional set of circumstances, Adjutant-General Anderson referred 
the case on to the Solicitor-General, Professor Kenneth Bailey, for his opinion 
in October 1950.92 Like Ham, Bailey concluded that there were issues that 
warranted the re-examination of the Nishimura trial. Comparing the 1949 
statements with the subsequent statements, Bailey noted that the ‘general 
effect of the new statements is that the original statements were not voluntary 
as the law understands the term, and if believed they do seem to throw doubt 
on the evidence as to what orders were given’.93 In his view the allegations 
made by the three witnesses and Nonaka as to the interrogatory methods used 
by Godwin, in conjunction with the marked similarities across the statements, 
raised questions about the voluntariness of the 1949 statements. As for the 
trial being presented on documentary evidence alone, Bailey thought that  
                                                 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid.   
90 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from Judge-Advocate General Simpson to the 
Adjutant General, 12 September 1950. 
91 Ibid. The allegations had not been adduced at trial. Judge-Advocate General Simpson had 
relied upon the High Court of Australia case of Green v The King (1939) 61 CLR 167 for the 
test for ascertaining fresh evidence. The war crimes courts were not civil courts and the 
military structure did not provide for the avenue of appeal. The war crimes courts had been 
established to avoid such technicalities as strict procedural and evidentiary requirements. 
92 NAA: M1505, 916 — Letter from Adjutant-General W Anderson to Solicitor-General 
K Bailey, 3 October 1950.  
93 NAA: M1505, 916 — Document titled ‘The Case of Nishimura’, 2.  
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the method of trial precluded certain advantages normally vouchsafed to the 
accused, and this consideration invites special caution in accepting any 
conclusion upon which doubt may be thrown, particularly in a case where 
the sentence is death.94  
The Solicitor-General concluded that there was scope in the War Crimes 
Regulations to conduct further investigation.95 Regulation 20, for example, 
gave the court an overarching discretion to adopt a course ‘as appears best 
calculated to do justice’.96 While correspondence indicates that the Solicitor-
General had not responded to Adjutant-General Anderson as of February 
1951,97 and his written report was not formally submitted, the two men had 
discussed the matter.98 
The defence filing of Nishimura’s second petition in August 1950 exceeded 
the 14 day time limit after the court’s findings. Pursuant to the March 1951 
recommendations of the Attorney-General, John Spicer, the case was treated 
as an application for remission pursuant to regulation 19 of the War Crimes 
Regulations, and referred back to Presiding Judge Townley.99 Judge Townley 
subsequently advised that there was no reason to remit the case because if the 
evidence had been presented at trial it would not have resulted in the variation 
of Nishimura’s sentence.100 Two of the original court members, Lieutenant-
Colonel Quinton and Major Gerling, were in agreement with Townley; 
Majors Hayes and Clarke were unavailable for consultation.101 On 4 May 
1951, Judge-Advocate General Simpson advised Adjutant-General Anderson 
that the finding and sentence should again be confirmed.102  
C Petitions Submitted to Cabinet 
In another atypical turn of events, Cabinet became involved in the case. 
Cabinet had been involved in selecting the list of trials for Manus Island, and 
                                                 
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid, in reference to War Crimes Regulations regs 19–20.  
96 Ibid. War Crimes Regulations reg 20 applied where cases arose that were not provided for in 
the Regulations.  
97 NAA: M1505, 916 — Letter from Minister for the Army J Francis to Attorney-General 
J Spicer, 12 February 1951.  
98 Pappas, above n 10, 77.  
99 NAA: M1505, 916 — Letter from Attorney-General J Spicer to Minister for the Army J 
Francis, 14 March 1951.  
100 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from President Townley to the Adjutant General, 30 
March 1951.  
101 Ibid.  
102 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Letter from Judge-Advocate General W B Simpson to 
Adjutant-General Anderson, 4 May 1951. 
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had prior knowledge of the cases. Petitions for mercy on behalf of various 
accused sentenced to death at Manus Island were made to Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies by the Holy See and Asai Kenkyo, a Buddhist priest based at 
Manus Island.103 Nishimura, as he was awaiting the death sentence at Manus 
Island, was included in the group that was the subject of Asai’s petition.104 A 
submission regarding the petitions was then referred to Cabinet by the 
Australian Military Forces.105 The Menzies government publicly announced 
its decision to endorse the death sentences of Nishimura and three other 
convicted war criminals by way of a press statement dated 30 May 1951.106 
The high-level political involvement in confirming these death sentences was 
an extremely rare occurrence that was confined to the Manus Island 
proceedings, and was largely prompted by the involvement of the 
aforementioned external petitioners. Nishimura was executed at Manus Island 
on 11 June 1951,107 and buried at sea.108   
V RESIDUAL QUESTIONS 
As outlined in this article, there are aspects of the trial that trouble this author 
and others. One problem is that Lieutenant Fujita managed to abscond 
midway through interrogation, resulting in the absence of the third co-accused 
from the trial.109 His unsworn statement that Nishimura’s order was for 
execution appeared to conflict with the evidence of Nishimura and Nonaka, 
and Fujita’s evidence may have therefore been pivotal.110 At various points it 
                                                 
103 NAA: A4905, 1 — Letter from Apostolic Delegation to Prime Minister Menzies, 11 April 
1951; NAA: A4905, 1 — Petition of Asai Kenkyo to Prime Minister Menzies, 9 April 1951; 
NAA: A4905, 1 — Note on Cabinet Submission No 1: Death Sentences Imposed by the War 
Crimes Court Manus Island, 10 May 1951. In addition, the Secretary of the YMCA in Japan 
communicated with the government, seeking to have the death sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment and for the prisoners to be paroled to Japan. See also NAA: MP742/1, 
336/1/2137 — Petition from Nakayama Choji to the Confirming Officer, 4 April 1951. This 
was the third petition submitted, and included a sworn statement of Nakayama Shikao 
(Nishimura’s former cellmate in Hong Kong prior to arrival in Manus Island), 8 March 1951. 
This petition reiterated the points that Nakayama had raised in his previous two submissions 
and was refused. 
104 NAA: A4905, 1 — Petition of Asai Kenkyo to Prime Minister Menzies, 9 April 1951, 
referring to the ‘12 persons who were sentenced to death by hanging’.  
105 Carrel, above n 10, 178.  
106 NAA: A471, 81942 — Prime Minister of Australia — Death Sentences of Japanese War 
Criminals (Press Statement, 30 May 1951). See also Carrel, above n 10, 178.  
107 NAA: A471, 81942 — Warrant of Execution — Nishimura, 11 June 1951; NAA: A471, 
81942 — Certificate by Officer Supervising the Execution, 11 June 1951. 
108 Mant, above n 3, 8. 
109 NAA: M1505, 916 — Extract of Japanese Police Report, 1949.  
110 NAA: A471, 81942 — Interrogation Record of Fujita Seizaburo, 6-7 September 1949; 
NAA: A471, 81942 — Petition from Nonaka Shoichi to Confirming Officer of the Australian 
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was implied that Fujita may have made a mistake in interpreting the order,111 
but given the dropping of charges against him and his absence from the 
courtroom such allegations could not hold much weight.     
The Australian Military Forces correspondence indicating that Hackney was 
unable to positively identify Nishimura is another troubling factor. There may 
be reasonable explanations for this, but it should be highlighted as an anomaly 
at the very least. Hackney had been severely wounded and ill-treated during 
the massacre, and witnesses are not always able to recollect every moment of 
an incident or particulars of every individual involved. But given the 
vividness and level of detail of Hackney’s account, and given that his 
evidence was pivotal to the prosecution’s case, the fact that he was later 
unable to positively identify Nishimura naturally stands out. Furthermore, the 
prosecution of the case on documentary evidence meant that the defence 
could not cross-examine Hackney on the contents of his affidavit.  
The degree of consistency across the three witness statements, and the 
allegations made by various Japanese officers, also raise questions about the 
voluntariness of evidence. If the defence counsel had requested that Inagaki, 
Hinokuma and Sono be called as witnesses — it would certainly have assisted 
in clarifying key evidence. However, it appears doubtful that the request 
would have been granted given the amount of extra time and resources 
required, and because their appearance as witnesses was technically not 
required under the War Crimes Act. 
During the trial, Nakayama did not seek to call any witnesses on behalf of 
Nishimura or Nonaka.112 Given that the life of a prisoner was at stake, it 
seems extraordinary that Nakayama did not even attempt to call witnesses.113 
Also, the allegations raised by Nonaka in regard to Godwin’s interrogation 
methods could have been raised with the three Japanese witnesses for 
inclusion in their additional statements tendered at trial. (It was evident that 
Godwin had interrogated Nonaka, Inagaki, Hinokuma and Sono.) 
                                                                                                                    
Army Legal Corps, 4 July 1950: ‘The Aide then came over to me and said, “it is in the 
General’s order that you execute all the prisoners of war” or words to that effect. After the 
General and his staff officers had left I caused the prisoners of war to be executed by machine 
gun and rifle fire.’ 
111NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 18; 
NAA: A471, 81942 — Petition from Nonaka Shoichi to Confirming Officer of the Australian 
Army Legal Corps, 4 July 1950 where Nonaka alleged that Fujita had misinterpreted 
Nishimura’s command of ‘shobun seyo’ to mean ‘execute’ them. 
112 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 10.  
113 NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/2137 — Petition from Nakayama Choji to the Confirming Authority, 
4 April 1951, where Nakayama later admitted to his own ‘carelessness’ in failing to summons 
the witnesses. 
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Furthermore, the subsequent petitions submitted on behalf of Nishimura were, 
after the initial unsuccessful petition, technically out of time. As previously 
noted, the Japanese defence teams faced numerous difficulties in the 
preparation of their cases, but in many respects Nakayama’s defence work 
could be criticised for lacking the requisite forcefulness required in those 
circumstances.  
Another issue arises from the fact that, although the conduct of the trial was 
independently examined by Major Ham and Professor Bailey, who both 
concluded that Nishimura’s case warranted re-examination, this did not occur. 
Professor Bailey, as Solicitor-General, was an academic and one of 
Australia’s most senior legal officers. On the other hand, Brigadier Townley 
and Judge-Advocate General Simpson were both Supreme Court judges and 
also had the benefit of experience in the sphere of military justice. However, 
both Professor Bailey and Major Ham raised concerns about aspects of the 
Nishimura trial. Given Professor Bailey’s legal standing, and Major Ham’s 
military and legal background as Assistant Director of Legal Services, their 
opinions should also have carried weight.  
In this author’s opinion, these issues raise doubts as to whether the outcome of 
the trial can be regarded as wholly conclusive. The discrepancies and 
ambiguities, if considered in their entirety, raise doubts, and such doubts are 
significant when the guilt of an accused sentenced to death on a charge of 
murder is in question. The war crimes legislation incorporated a catch-all 
provision in regulation 20 that enabled the court to adopt any necessary 
measures in the dispensation of justice, which in this case, should have been 
used to conduct further investigations.  
It is, however, certainly arguable that Nishimura had some degree of 
culpability. The fact that Nishimura had been present at the scene is not 
disputed. Nishimura was General Officer Commanding and therefore 
responsible for the command of subordinates of various rankings. Putting 
aside the debates about the actual order given and the intention behind the 
order, Nishimura himself admitted that he gave the order of ‘shobun seyo’. 
The Japanese military code, and strict adherence to orders given by superiors 
on behalf of the Emperor,114 placed the utmost responsibility on commanders 
for the conduct of their subordinates. At the trial’s close, Nishimura told the 
court, ‘I am very sorry that due to my carelessness in this case such an 
incident as this happened. I wish to give praise with sorrow to those who were 
killed in this case. That is all’.115 In this closing statement he admitted to his 
                                                 
114 Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II (Westview Press, 
1996) 201–2. 
115 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, sheet no 93.   
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own ‘carelessness’ in the matter. The fact that Nishimura had failed to 
exercise proper supervision of his subordinates was also conceded by 
Nakayama in a subsequent petition.116 The prosecuting counsel’s closing 
address referred to the failure of Nishimura to either conduct a subsequent 
enquiry or to punish his subordinates for the executions.117 The prosecuting 
counsel’s references to Nishimura’s failures correlate with certain elements of 
the doctrine of command responsibility.118 At the time of the post-World War 
II trials, the legal concept of command responsibility was evolving in 
international law and it was applied in cases involving other senior Japanese 
officers in the Australian war crimes courts.119  
An Australian Military Forces file note dated 1949 referred to inadequate 
evidence for a direct charge of participation but highlighted Nishimura’s 
exposure to a charge of command responsibility.120 In contrast, notes drafted 
in 1945 after General Yamashita’s interrogation, indicated that a case could be 
made out against Nishimura for ordering the executions.121 Ultimately, the 
case was prosecuted on the ground that Nishimura had ordered that the 
prisoners of war be executed. However, as outlined in this article, problems 
arose in the construction of evidence regarding Nishimura’s relevant orders. 
In practical terms, it may have been difficult for the Australian Military 
Forces to have prosecuted a charge of command responsibility given the 
inability of authorities to locate Fujita, and the deaths of Imai, Morioka and 
Toda. Possibly another consideration for why command responsibility was not 
used in the Nishimura trial was that the massacre was confined to Parit Sulong 
and not dispersed over a wide geographical area, or that the Australian 
authorities considered their case against Nishimura for ordering the 
executions as clear-cut. Theoretically, command responsibility was a plausible 
                                                 
116 NAA: A471, 81942 — Petition from Nakayama Choji to the Confirming Officer, 29 June 
1950. 
117 NAA: A471, 81942 — Transcript of Proceedings — Nishimura and Nonaka, Closing 
Address of Prosecution, 3.   
118 For detailed discussion of the elements of command responsibility (also referred to as 
‘superior responsibility’) in historical and contemporary contexts, see, eg, Gideon Boas, 
James L Bischoff and Natalie L Reid, Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007); Guénaël Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility 
(Oxford University Press, 2009); Andrew Mitchell, ‘Failure to Halt, Prevent or Punish: The 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility for War Crimes’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law Review 381.  
119 See, eg, Pappas, above n 10, 237, 255.  
120 NAA: MP721/1, 336/1/1962 — File note of Major H Dick, 4 April 1949. Lack of positive 
identification was cited as the reason for ‘inadequate evidence’ although the file note was 
drafted some six months prior to the interrogation of the three Japanese witnesses.  
121 NAA: MP721/1, 336/1/1962 — Notes of Proposed Interrogation of Japanese General 
Officers in Japan by Major C Wild, 9 November 1945. The notes suggested that the 
interrogating officer ‘should assume as a fact that NISHIMURA was the senior officer in 
question’ (capitalisation in the original).  
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form of criminal liability that could have been used in the charge/s against 
Nishimura, and one that was supported by the undisputed facts of the matter.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The various problems in the trial of Lieutenant-General Nishimura arose from 
the extremely broad discretion granted to the court to permit evidence to be 
adduced before it, and from the application of the death sentence. Section 9(1) 
of the War Crimes Act effectively allowed cases to be prosecuted entirely on 
documentary evidence. In practice, this meant that key witnesses in the 
Nishimura trial such as Lieutenant Hackney, Lieutenant Inagaki, Captain 
Hinokuma and Captain Sono were not required to give oral testimony in 
court. The ambiguities and inconsistencies arising in witness evidence — 
particularly with regard to Hackney’s inability to identify Nishimura and the 
three Japanese witnesses’ conflicting evidence on what order Nishimura had 
given — were unable to be tested before the court.  
In contrast to a standard court-martial, the Los Negros court was able to hand 
down death sentences for a wide range of war crimes. The legislative and 
regulatory frameworks governing the trial of war crimes, like those governing 
military courts but unlike those governing domestic courts vested with 
criminal jurisdiction, did not include an independent appeals channel. 
Furthermore, the war crimes court differed from a standard court-martial in 
that the authority vested with the power to confirm death sentences was, in 
this particular case, the Adjutant-General. In Nishimura’s case, the petitions 
were considered by Adjutant-General Anderson and Judge-Advocate General 
Simpson. The unusual circumstances in this case included the referral of the 
matter to Solicitor-General Bailey, and, formally, to Cabinet for final 
approval. (The involvement of the external petitioners warranted the high-
level political involvement.) There was majority consensus that the findings 
should be confirmed, but the two contrasting opinions given by Major Ham 
and Professor Bailey are indicative of the problematic aspects of the trial.  
The war crimes legislation enabled the trials of Japanese accused in military 
courts, with the overarching purpose being the implementation of post-
conflict justice for war crimes committed against Australian, Allied and 
associated forces during World War II. The war crimes courts, under the 
legislation, exercised broad discretion in regard to the admissibility of 
evidence and the choice of sentence. This enabled the expeditious conduct of 
proceedings. These objectives were precariously balanced, at times, against 
the need to ensure justice for the accused and the requirement that guilt be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This precarious balance can be seen in the 
Nishimura trial. Questions about the degree of justice achieved by this case 
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are raised by a combination of, first, the prosecution of the case wholly on 
documentary evidence; second, the application of low admissibility 
thresholds; third, the questionable voluntariness and reliability of witness 
evidence; and, last, the fact that the death penalty was imposed.  
It is acknowledged that the trial was conducted at a time and in a type of 
forum far removed from contemporary fair trial principles. It is true that the 
Australian authorities ensured that Nishimura was assisted by defence 
counsel, that adjournments might have been permitted if his counsel had made 
such requests to the court, and that numerous petitions by the accused over a 
one year period were considered. But in a method of trial where the floor for 
admissible evidence is set too low, and the ceiling of capital punishment 
placed too high, there is more opportunity for problems to arise in the pursuit 
of justice. Whilst more than 60 years have passed since this trial commenced, 
it is arguable that certain aspects of the Nishimura case remain open to debate 
to this very day. 
